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Abstract  
This paper discusses the challenges of performing a forensic investigation against a multi-node Hadoop 
cluster and proposes a methodology for examiners to use in such situations. The procedure’s aim of 
minimising disruption to the data centre during the acquisition process is achieved through the use of 
RAM forensics. This affords initial cluster reconnaissance which in turn facilitates targeted data 
acquisition on the identified DataNodes. To evaluate the methodology’s feasibility, a small Hadoop 
Distributed File System (HDFS) was configured, and forensic artefacts simulated upon it by deleting 
data originally stored in in the cluster. RAM acquisition and analysis was then performed on the 
NameNode in order to test the validity of the suggested methodology.  The results are cautiously 
positive in establishing that RAM analysis of the NameNode can be used to pinpoint the data blocks 
affected by the attack, allowing a targeted approach to the acquisition of data from the DataNodes, 
provided that the physical locations can be determined. A full forensic analysis of the DataNodes was 
beyond the scope of this project.   
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1. Introduction  
We are at an ‘evolutionary point in a new era of the computing environment’ (Daryabar et al, 2013). To 
satisfy the ever-increasing throughput requirements of big data, the use of distributed computing 
architectures is growing exponentially, and corporate giants such as Facebook, Amazon, and Yahoo! all 
now use data centres with thousands of nodes holding many petabytes of data. Such data stores pose 
an attractive target to criminals, and The Cloud Security Alliance (2014) name 'Data breach' and 'Data 
loss' as two primary threats to cloud computing, while the ISC2
 
White Paper IX (2013) identified seven 
main concerns in relation to cloud security that include data loss, forensic readiness, and 
uninterrupted availability.  It is clear from these concerns that despite the widespread adoption of 
distributed and cloud computing, there is uncertainty as to whether the technology can handle a data 
breach scenario. Garfinkel (2010) had already foreseen the coming challenges, with the bleak 
prognosis that digital forensics was at the end of its golden age, entering a time of crisis due to 
expanding technologies and their technical, business-centric and legal challenges. 
Apache Hadoop is among the most implemented distributed computer architectures for storing and 
processing big data. Used by Internet giants and SMEs alike (the latter often through outsourced 
services), Hadoop has been transformative in the business sphere with an estimated 76% of Fortune 
companies implementing the technology by 2015 (Business insider, 2014). Thus we have selected a 
Hadoop implementation to propose and test a forensic methodology that exemplifies how the above 
challenges can be addressed through the use of live RAM forensics which facilitate targeted data 
acquisition.  
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We regard the contribution of this paper to be the following: 
i. Offer insight into aspects of Hadoop HDFS architecture and how they affect forensic analysis; 
ii. Propose a tailored variation of cloud forensic methodology, based on earlier work by various 
authors, that is based on the findings of contribution i and thus applicable to Hadoop HDFS 
data breach scenarios (see Section 4.2 and Figure 1);  
iii. Provide a case study that evaluates the feasibility of our methodology (contribution ii) with 
particular focus on the steps that afford initial triage for data acquisition. 
2. Background 
Complex business and legal demands create impediments to 'in-cloud' forensics that add to the 
problem of traditional forensic approaches being rendered infeasible by the sheer volume of data, 
however the question of forensic readiness has not yet been answered. The need for a forensic 
methodology scalable to the big data age is apparent.   
In ‘traditional’ digital forensic investigations well-established guidelines and methodologies, such as 
the ACPO guidelines (Association of Chief Police Officers) and DFRWS guidelines (Digital Forensic 
Research Workshop), are used to safeguard the validity and integrity of evidence and the investigative 
process as a whole. Traditional methodologies utilise 'dead' acquisition techniques as a means of 
evidence gathering in which identical bit-to-bit images are produced. However, given that indexing 
speed decreases as the volume of data increases (Lee and Hong, 2011) this approach is not well suited 
for big data forensic scenarios such as in a Hadoop cluster. Writing to four external devices 
simultaneously with a transfer rate of over 6GB/min, it would take 28 days to produce a bit-to-bit 
image of one petabyte of data (Fowler, 2012). As Fowler (2012) underlines, ideally this image should 
not be examined directly, but instead used as a master image from which a further copy should be 
produced for examination, to avoid the risk of irrevocably contaminating the image during an 
investigation. When factoring in the imaging of the image, the acquisition stage alone of a petabyte of 
data is 56 days (Fowler, 2012).  
When considering forensics, it is important to contextualise Hadoop’s adoption within the business 
sphere, as further challenges become apparent. Although Hadoop can be run "in-house" at a 
company’s own data centre, SMEs will typically not have the facilities or the administrative capacities 
to maintain their own cluster. In these instances, Hadoop will be used as a Platform as a Service (PaaS) 
through cloud service providers (CSPs) such as Amazon's EC2 (Grispos et al, 2012). If a data breach 
were to occur in these instances then the acquisition stage of the forensic investigation also takes on 
further legal and ethical issues; namely multi-tenancy – multiple clients sharing access to a CSP’s data 
nodes (Barrett and Kipper, 2010; Martini and Choo, 2012), and organisational – the involvement of a 
third party (the CSP) in the investigation (Ruan et al, 2011). A further legal consideration arises when 
considering that a CSP's cluster may physically reside in a different country from the breached client, 
meaning that both parties are governed by different legislation and jurisdictions (Spyridopoulos and 
Katos, 2011).   
Blanket dead acquisition is infeasible when these considerations are made. Indeed, even if an 
organisation maintains its own datacentre, rendering the legal considerations less applicable, the 
lengthy process of imaging all of the nodes in the cluster will still cause undesirable downtime resulting 
in a loss of business (Cho et al, 2012). It is therefore apparent that methodologies such as the ACPO 
and DFRWS guidelines are unworkable for big data storage environments (Grispos et al, 2012; Hegarty 
et al, 2012; Lallie and Pimlott, 2012; Martini and Choo, 2012; Poisel et al, 2013), and a new set of both 
technical and procedural guidelines need to be established to deal with the complex challenges 
highlighted (Cho et al, 2012; Martini and Choo, 2012).  
3. Hadoop Architecture 
Hadoop is a Java based system built for UNIX based operating systems. The Hadoop Distributed File 
System (HDFS) is a master/slave architecture in which DataNodes (slaves) are set up in racks (a 
grouping of nodes in the same network topology – effectively each rack is a LAN) and clusters (the 
overarching grouping of racks in an implementation), and receive read/write instructions from the 
NameNode (master). In HDFS a file is fragmented into blocks which are then distributed among the 
DataNodes in the cluster. The fragmented file is replicated across different physical addresses in the 
cluster to provide redundancy in the event of node failure (Apache, 2013). The standard replication 
factor for data blocks in HDFS is three, meaning that every block will have an original and two further 
copies placed in the cluster (Apache, 2013). Hadoop is a scalable architecture optimised for a small 
number of very large files; a single file could be petabytes in size and fragmented into thousands of 
blocks.  
3.1 NameNode  
To keep track of the many DataNodes, the NameNode stores a block mapping namespace that 
contains the physical addresses of each HDFS block within the cluster. It deduces this from information 
about the blocks in their logical HDFS which is sent periodically by the DataNodes via TCP heartbeat 
signals (White, 2014). As these block mappings are stored in RAM, they are volatile and the amount of 
RAM required is proportional to the amount of data stored in HDFS.   
The NameNode also stores metadata about HDFS persistently in its local filesystem in two files, 
FsImage and the Edits log. FsImage is a point in time snapshot of all file system metadata; it contains a 
serialised form of every data block and HDFS directory in the file system. It also stores metadata 
pertaining to the Hadoop environment configuration including replication level, block size and 
modification times (White, 2014). However, FsImage does not contain any physical address mapping 
information (White, 2014). The Edits log is a transaction log that records changes to the file system 
metadata in real time, including changes to block-to-file-mappings, block replications and 
access/modification timestamps. A checkpointing process is used to periodically write these changes 
back to FsImage (see Section 3.4).  
3.2 DataNodes  
The DataNodes are the ‘workhorses’ of HDFS (White, 2014) which store the data blocks allocated by 
the NameNode via write requests. The data blocks are typically either 64MB or 128MB in size. To 
HDFS, the cluster file system, each is a replica of a file fragment. However, the DataNode's underlying 
local file system (e.g. Linux) regards each as a plain file and stores it as such. Therefore, when a data 
block is deleted by HDFS, its corresponding file will remain in the unallocated space of the DataNode’s 
local file system until overwritten.  
3.3 Secondary NameNode / Backup Node 
The Secondary NameNode can be thought of as the ‘checkpointing server’ (White, 2014). A designated 
node within the Hadoop architecture is required to handle checkpointing as the Edits log can grow to 
be very large in size (potentially 999,999 transactions), making the process both potentially time 
consuming and memory exhaustive (White, 2014).   
From Hadoop 2 onwards, the Backup Node replaces the Secondary NameNode. In addition to handling 
the checkpointing process, it maintains a copy of the file system namespace in RAM, mirroring the 
NameNode (Apache, 2014).  
3.4 Forensic Considerations 
The physical HDFS block address namespace is of vital forensic importance, as knowledge of physical 
block locations in the cluster enables the targeted acquisition of selected DataNodes. As this is stored 
only in the NameNode’s RAM (Spyridopoulos and Katos 2011), it would be lost if dead acquisition 
techniques were employed on the NameNode. Thus traditional methods in which RAM acquisition is 
avoided are too comprehensive and fundamental in approach to meet the needs of big data 
requirements (Lee et al, 2014). In forensic investigations carried out on a Hadoop 2.4.1 instance, it 
would be advantageous to perform RAM acquisition of the Backup Node instead of the NameNode. 
This would minimise interaction with the NameNode whilst in a live state, whilst also providing the 
potential to acquire a perfect replica of the namespace mapping.  
Forensically the FsImage file, Edits log, and checkpointing process are also important components of 
HDFS. Information of forensic value that can be deduced from FsImage includes the block-to-file 
mappings, replication level, and modification/access times. However, if much time has elapsed since 
the last checkpoint, FsImage could be vastly outdated and the Edits log could potentially contain 
hundreds of thousands of transactions that have not been recorded in real time by FsImage. Default 
HDFS settings trigger an automatic checkpoint after 1,000,000 transactions or one hour, whichever 
comes first (Apache, 2013, Wang, 2014). If fifty-five minutes had elapsed since the last checkpoint and 
the Hadoop cluster had an average of 500 transactions per minute, the FsImage file would be out of 
date by 27,000 transactions which are recorded in the Edits log only. To ensure that the most recent 
state of the file system is used during an acquisition, Fowler (2012) advocates the use of checkpointing 
prior to acquiring physical data from the nodes. A copy of the original Edits log should be retained to 
enable the investigator to examine the most recent changes directly.   
4. Existing Research and Practices in DFS and Cloud Forensic Acquisition 
This section summarises selected works by a number of authors who have discussed forensic methods 
for data breaches in distributed file system or cloud contexts, and discusses their applicability to the 
specific context of Hadoop HDFS.    
Spyridopoulos and Katos (2011) present an analysis of the Google File System (GFS) and outline a 
template for a tailored forensic recovery tool. They point out that, in DFS data breach scenarios, 
evidence manifests as either content or non-content based. The former includes slaves storing the 
target data while transaction logs and metadata fall into the latter category and are usually found on 
the master. A suitable methodology needs to access both forms of evidence; Spyridopoulos and Katos 
(2011) address this by delving into the metadata and log files of the master node, as well as 
unallocated space in the data nodes. Spyridopoulos and Katos (2011) classify DFS data breach 
scenarios into four categories and discuss the forensic challenges posed by each. The first category, 
where the attacked data is live, i.e. has not been deleted, and the cluster is held in-house or within the 
investigation’s jurisdiction, does not pose any particular problems; standard forensic procedures can 
be applied. They point out that the second category, where data is live but resides outside the 
jurisdiction, can be reduced to a first category problem by leveraging the file systems replication 
mechanisms. Via the client’s computer, working slaves can be set up within the jurisdiction. By 
deliberately causing the slaves outside the jurisdiction to fail, the file system is induced to replicate the 
data blocks onto the working slaves, thus transferring them into the jurisdiction. Spyridopoulos and 
Katos (2011) distinguish the different perspectives of the master and slaves: a block is a fragment of a 
user file to HDFS and regarded as such by the master, but the slaves’ local file system regards the block 
as a file. This is important in cases where the data in question has been permanently deleted, because 
it means that the block will persist locally in unallocated space until it is overwritten. Therefore, 
standard forensic data carving methods can be used to recover deleted blocks provided it is known 
which slave the data can be found on and this slave is within the jurisdiction (third category). 
Additionally, the physical offset on the slave’s disk needs to be known in order to avoid the privacy 
issues that would result from having to acquire an entire slave in multi-tenancy situations. In the fourth 
category, where data is deleted and resides outside the jurisdiction, any investigation relies on 
international legal agreements. Spyridopoulos and Katos (2011) summarise their high-level method in 
a flow chart. After identification of evidence sources (master's RAM, log files, slaves), this is analysed to 
check whether data has been deleted, followed by establishing whether the blocks are inside 
jurisdiction. If yes, the blocks can be acquired from the local filesystem and reconstructed. However, as 
Spyridopoulos and Katos (2011) point out, in the case of deleted data, acquisition additionally relies on 
knowledge of the block to last chunk metadata, which may be available from the slave's local file 
system until it is overwritten. In case of the latter, the data is lost. 
The example presented by Spyridopoulos and Katos (2011) shows an acquisition walkthrough for an in-
house scenario with two small files of interest, one of which has been deleted, and thus combines their 
first and third category. The setup comprises four slaves which physically reside on the same machine 
but use different ports for communication with the master, and uses the Cloudstore distributed file 
system which is similar to GFS. They present a detailed analysis of the master node's log files to 
determine the data nodes on which the blocks in question are/were stored, and proceed to 
reconstruct the files, but provide little detail as to how they obtain the block to last chunk information.  
Spyridopoulos and Katos conclude with a gap analysis. For cloud storage systems to be forensically 
ready, four issues need to be addressed: 1. Legal agreements between involved countries, 2. 
Legislation for digital data retention upon deletion, 3. The block to last chunk mapping must be 
implemented in the cloud architecture and 4. Implementation of persistent storage of chunk locations 
in file records. While all of these suggestions are desirable, they are outwith the control of forensic 
investigators or clients.  
Cho et al (2012) present a high level method specifically for Hadoop based systems, which follows the 
standard process of preparation, identification, collection, analysis and reporting. Their method 
iterates through collection and analysis twice, firstly capturing the volatile data held in the NameNode 
using a combination of live and dead acquisition methods and performing real-time analysis of the 
NameNode's FsImage and Edits log to ascertain which of the DataNodes store the data in question. 
This is followed by imaging the DataNodes with dead acquisition techniques and analysing the 
resulting artefacts. Cho et al (2012) do not present a case study or specific scenario to illustrate their 
proposals. It could be argued that the use of dead acquisition on entire data nodes does not adhere to 
the pragmatic considerations and ethical dimensions outlined in Section 2.  
Fowler (2012) does not present a methodology as such, but discusses HDFS architecture through the 
eyes of a forensic analyst, pinpointing the most important artefacts for an investigation including RAM, 
FsImage and Edits log, and emphasising the forensic importance of manually triggering a checkpoint 
(see Section 3.4). Fowler (2012) also discusses the potential value of the HDFS Trash, which is disabled 
by default (Apache, 2013, 2014), but often enabled by administrators as it is recommended for 
example by Cloudera (2015). If enabled, it means that files are not fully removed upon deletion, but 
moved to trash where they remain available for a set period. However, even when trash is enabled, 
deleted blocks may be not found there because (a) the time limit may have been exceeded, (b) using 
the 'hadoop fs -rm -r' command with the '-skipTrash' option provides an easy anti-forensic measure 
and (c) programmatic deletion via third party interfaces would use the trash only if this functionality is 
specifically provided by the interface (Cloudera, 2015). 
Martini and Choo (2012) present an integrated iterative conceptual cloud forensic framework that 
focuses on the preservation and collection of cloud computing data for forensic purposes and aims to 
address the issues discussed in Section 2. The framework comprises four phases, namely 1. Evidence 
source identification and preservation, 2. Collection, 3. Examination and analysis and 4. Reporting and 
presentation. This appears similar to traditional digital forensic frameworks, but differs in iterating 
through phases 1-3 several times, using the information from each iteration in the next. Martini and 
Choo (2012) also emphasise that evidence preservation should commence as soon as the use of cloud 
services has been identified in order to account for the cloud's ever changing environment. Martini and 
Choo (2014a; 2014b) carry out technical experiments to validate the method, using XtreemFS and 
VMware vCloud respectively as case studies. The number of iterations and their specific purpose vary; 
for XtreemFS, which is more closely related to HDFS than VMware vCloud, three iterations are used 
relating to evidence from the directory service, the metadata and replica catalog and the object 
storage device respectively. The latter correlates with the DataNodes in HDFS while the former two 
correspond to various aspects of information stored in the NameNode's log files and RAM. 
The design of our methodology (see Section 5.2) is based on the work presented above, namely 
Martini and Choo (2012; 2014a; 2014b), Spyridopoulos and Katos (2011), Fowler (2012), Cho et al 
(2012) and Patrascu and Patriciu (2014).  
5. Design of Methodology  
5.1 Requirements  
In order to reflect Hadoop’s functionality, business implementation context, and the time constraints 
of the forensic acquisition process, a suitable forensic methodology must have the following 
characteristics:  
Scalable - Given that Hadoop implementations can range from a single standalone machine to clusters 
containing hundreds or more machines it is of fundamental importance that the methodology be 
scalable to meet the requirements of data centres of varying sizes. A methodology must also be 
scalable to the amount of data that is held within the cluster, as Hadoop implementations commonly 
host petabytes of data.  
Business Aware – As Hadoop is typically implemented within a business context, a methodology needs 
to be conscious of the fact that the breached party has already been inconvenienced by the attack and 
should minimise further business disruption. The use of targeted acquisition is one such way to achieve 
this by reducing node down time at the start of the investigation.  
Targeted – To reduce acquisition time and minimise business disruption to the breached party, it is 
desirable to image only the DataNodes storing the data replicas relevant to the investigation. This 
move away from traditional blanket acquisition requires foreknowledge of what data has been 
affected by the data breach and where this data physically resides in the cluster.   
Use Live/Dead Acquisition Techniques – Only live acquisition of the NameNode can capture the RAM 
which stores the physical HDFS block address namespace necessary for targeted acquisition of the 
DataNodes (see Section 3.4). There is no need for live acquisition of DataNodes as the data is stored 
persistently and the system would use replicas of the data to maintain availability while DataNodes are 
taken off-line one by one.  
Reliable – To be reliable, a forensic investigation must use up to date information. Checkpointing is 
suggested as a means of ensuring that the metadata acquired from FsImage is an accurate and up-to-
date representation of the file system at the time of acquisition (see Section 3.4).   
Minimise Cluster Interaction – Direct interaction with all nodes should be kept to a minimum to 
reduce the risk of contamination not just of the evidence, but also of the target company’s data in the 
cluster. Additionally, a data centre may be located at considerable distance from the affected client 
and/or access may be controlled by the CSP, restricting the time available to the investigator in which 
they can physically enter the data centre to perform their acquisition tasks.   
Applicable to Local/Outsourced Implementation – Given that Hadoop implementations can exist both 
as local data centres and outsourced via CSPs, a methodology needs to exist which is implementable in 
both scenarios.  
5.2 Design  
The proposed forensic methodology for Hadoop data breach scenarios is based on existing work 
summarised in Section 4 and meets the requirements discussed in Section 5.1.  It comprises nine 
phases which are illustrated in Figure 1 and detailed in the following subsections.  
 Figure 1. Proposed forensic methodology. The nine phases are described in Section 5.2 and applied to a test scenario in Section 
6.2. Labels on the left match those used by Martini and Choo (2012, 2014a) for comparison, while labels at the top identify the 
corresponding nodes. 
Phase 1 – Preparation  
To prepare for the forensic investigation, the examiner needs to identify basic properties of the HDFS 
to be investigated such as the NameNode's address and its jurisdiction, as well as gaining access by 
obtaining suitable credentials. 
Phase 2 – Live acquisition of NameNode RAM and volatile artefacts  
The NameNode’s RAM namespace facilitates the identification of the physical offset mappings of HDFS 
data blocks on the DataNodes. Live acquisition of the NameNode is of vital importance to avoid losing 
this information, which is crucial as the methodology must be able to distinguish areas affected by the 
attack in order to facilitate targeted acquisition (Sections 3.4 and 4). Time is of the essence for RAM 
capture as heartbeat signals are sent only by live data blocks, meaning that our chances of retrieving 
the vital offsets sent via these heartbeats will decline rapidly after data deletion. Placing this Phase 
before the cluster reconnaissance is in line with Martini and Choo (2014b). 
At this stage the FsImage and Edits log files should also be preserved and copied from the NameNode 
to a forensic workstation. Although these files are stored persistently, the Edits log is highly volatile 
due to the fact that it records all cluster transactions in real time. Whilst less volatile than the Edits log, 
the FsImage file, which contains the HDFS tree and metadata, is still a volatile artefact as it is expected 
to be modified at least hourly by the automatic checkpointing process (Section 3.4).  
Phase 3 – Initial cluster reconnaissance  
The purpose of this phase is to acquire knowledge of file system metadata that provides useful 
information for how the investigation should progress, such as block size, replication factor and 
DataNode associated with given block IDs. This phase is independent of the NameNode RAM 
acquisition and could be carried out first, however, even the shortest delay to RAM acquisition could 
risk losing vital information. Any commands issued could affect the RAM, risking forensically 
undesirable contamination of potential evidence.  
This phase uses Hadoop inbuilt commands, primarily designed for cluster administration, which are 
available in the live system through the Hadoop web user interface and various inbuilt command line 
scripts (Fowler, 2012). Of the numerous command scripts that could be used in this phase we 
recommend three in particular: the Hadoop file system checking utility ‘hadoop fsck’, the ‘dfsadmin  
-report’ script and the OIV image viewer. Detailed information about these commands can be found in 
Section 6.2 (Phase 3) and sample output in Figures 4a, 4b and 5 respectively. 
Fowler (2012) recommends using inbuilt command-line scripts such as these as they give complete 
information while the web user interface shows only a selected subset. These commands should be 
grouped in pre-programmed and exhaustively tested prepared scripts and executed remotely from a 
forensic workstation in order to meet the requirement of minimising interaction with the cluster, 
particularly the NameNode, and mitigating the risk of evidence contamination by ensuring that any 
effect on the cluster is entirely predictable. 
Phase 4 – Checkpointing via a forensic workstation  
Fowler (2012) recognised that unless the examiner performs a checkpoint operation prior to acquiring 
and analysing the FsImage and Edits log, the metadata contained within the FsImage has the potential 
to be vastly out of sync with the accurate state of the file system (see Section 3.4). However, doing so 
risks contaminating the NameNode’s volatile memory as java processes to transfer the FsImage file to 
the Secondary NameNode are invoked.  
To alleviate the risk of data contamination within the live cluster, and in line with the principle of 
minimising cluster interaction during the investigation, we carry out the checkpointing process outside 
the cluster on a forensic workstation with Hadoop configured in pseudo-distributed mode. Copies of 
the FsImage and Edits logs collected in Phase 2 are placed on the forensic workstation and the 
checkpoint triggered using the inbuilt command 'checkpoint -force'. The checkpoint operation flushes 
the Edits log out to the FsImage file in order to update the state of the HDFS namespace. All of the 
previously unmapped transactions are mapped into the FsImage file, updating its information on the 
HDFS namespace, and the Edits log is emptied. However, as the transactions themselves are of high 
forensic value in an investigation, it is recommended that a copy of both original files is made on the 
forensic workstation before triggering the checkpoint process. This ensures that the examiner has at 
her disposal both the updated view of the HDFS namespace and a record of all transactions that 
occurred between the time of the previous checkpoint operation and the attack (see Phase 6).  
Patrascu and Patriciu (2014) suggest the use of a hypervisor layer to aid in the processing of forensic 
artefacts by running MapReduce scripts on virtual machines. MapReduce is a parallel processing 
framework which achieves speed gains of several orders of magnitude in processing data stored in 
HDFS by distributing tasks across a number of slaves (White, 2014). The hypervisor approach is an 
innovative use of virtualisation, and such a process could well be followed as an alternative method to 
aid checkpointing outside of the cluster. 
Phase 5 – Live artefact analysis  
During this phase the artefacts gathered in Phases 2 and 4 are analysed in order to establish first which 
data blocks have been affected by the attack (in our case deleted). Up until this stage the investigator 
(and indeed breached party) may have no inclination as to what the specific blocks that were targeted 
in the attack. By performing analysis on the NameNode RAM image acquired in Phase 2, the examiner 
is able to identify the blockIDs and startOffset values targeted in the attack. These values are 
significant with HDFS because they relate to the internal blockID given to the specified HDFS data 
block, and the physical start offset address that the located at within the DataNode's storage. These 
values are of key importance to our methodology as they enable later targeted acquisition of the 
DataNodes.  
Further to the analysis of the NameNode RAM, the FsImage file should also be analysed in this phase. 
Following the checkpoint conducted in Phase 4, the file should contain an up to date record of the 
HDFS namespace. This is of forensic value as it will provide the examiner with an idea of the basic tree 
structure of the target HDFS directory, and give context to the investigation at end. Further to this, 
differential analysis between the pre and post checkpoint versions of the FsImage file (as discussed in 
Phase 4) can provide a beneficial first point of call to identify any obvious discrepancies that occurred 
to the HDFS tree following the time of the attack.   
Phase 6 – Establish suspect transactions and map to data blocks  
This phase can reveal evidence of attack provenance through cross-referencing with scheduled delete 
and copy requests from HDFS (Fowler, 2012). Furthermore, this stage may aid scoping the attack by 
uncovering HDFS data blocks affected in the attack that had not been previously identified as such.  
The copy of the original Edits log is analysed to establish suspect transactions which took place during 
the attack timeframe. Creating a copy of the Edits log and FsImage file prior to the checkpoint 
operation on the forensic workstation enables complete analysis of all transactions even after the Edits 
log has been flushed during the checkpoint (see Phase 4). 
As well as analysing the Edits log, the examiner should also continue their analysis of the NameNode 
RAM capture for corroborating evidence. In the previous phase the examiner was able to establish 
through the RAM capture what blocks had been targeted in the attack, this phase expands the analysis 
by seeking to establish what happened to those blocks during the attack.  
Phase 7 – Perform targeted dead acquisition of DataNodes  
By this phase of the investigation it is anticipated that the examiner will have established which blocks 
were affected by the attack and where they physically reside in the cluster, meaning that acquisition 
can now commence on the DataNodes themselves. Knowledge of the findings of previous stages 
enables the investigator to establish a minimal set of DataNodes which comprises at least one replica 
of each file or block suspected to be affected by the attack. This enables the investigator to selectively 
target only the required DataNodes for imaging. Shutting down one DataNode at a time minimises 
business disruption as the cluster as a whole will remain operational thanks to the inbuilt redundancy 
of HDFS data storage. 
If the start offset of a target block for acquisition is known in combination with the block size, there is 
potential for an even more targeted approach, where only the relevant blocks are imaged rather than 
the whole DataNode. This is akin to on-the-fly file carving. However, it should be noted that whilst this 
method would be ideal, it may not always be possible due to local file system data fragmentation.    
Phase 8 – Data reconstruction  
Once the DataNodes have been imaged they can be analysed for traces of deleted data blocks which 
can then be reconstructed through data carving. Despite reducing the volume of the data to be 
analysed through selective imaging of the nodes, this is likely to be a resource and time exhaustive 
procedure. One option for increasing the efficiency of this phase could be to load the raw disk images 
into a forensic HDFS installation and use MapReduce to aid the processing of the data (Carrier, 2015; 
Hegarty et al, 2012; Lee and Hong, 2011; Lee et al, 2014; Lee and Un, 2012; Patrascu and Patriciu, 
2014).  
Phase 9 – Report findings  
As with all forensic investigations this methodology culminates in reporting the findings to the relevant 
stake holders.  
6. Testing 
6.1 Scenario Preparation 
In order to test the feasibility of the proposed methodology, a small Hadoop cluster comprising one 
master and three slaves was configured in fully distributed mode on commodity hardware running 
Ubunutu 14.04 (see Figure 2). Each machine had 4GB RAM and Intel Dual Core processors.  
 
 
Figure 2. Network topology of the Hadoop cluster used for testing, including IP addresses, hostnames, nodes and replicated 
data blocks A, B, C.  
Hadoop 1.2.1 was used for the purpose of this experiment. Although there are newer 2.x.x additions, 
1.x.x is not redundant; many organisations choose to implement this version as it best suits their 
requirements. Indeed, all of Amazon’s EMR Hadoop platforms are offered both as 2.x.x and 1.x.x 
implementations. Given the relative infancy of the field of Hadoop forensics, it was felt prudent to 
focus attention on the original version of the platform in this instance.   
Spyridopoulos and Katos (2011) categorise HDFS data breach attacks in two dimensions. The first 
dimension distinguishes by jurisdiction, between attacks where the breached data resides within the 
physical and legal jurisdiction of the breached party (i.e. an attack on a cluster managed internally by 
the breached party) and attacks in which the breached data is outside of the jurisdiction of the 
breached party (for example in hosted cloud services such as AWS). By using an in-house cluster, our 
test scenario fits into the former category. It is designed as a proof of concept, allowing us to establish 
the feasibility of our methodology in principle before considering its scalability and applicability to the 
more problematic area of outsourced services. The second dimension considered by Spyridopoulos 
and Katos (2011) concerns the state of the breached data after the attack, which could be live (in the 
case of unauthorised access or modification) or deleted. As discussed in Section 4, the latter category 
poses additional challenges particularly when the block metadata may also have been overwritten. We 
therefore devised a scenario in line with the latter, simulating a situation whereby data had been 
illicitly deleted from the Hadoop cluster. If selective acquisition of blocks from NameNodes is shown to 
be feasible in this ‘worst case’, the further work required to extend this study to include live data 
should be minimal. 
To obtain sample data to store on the cluster, we downloaded the 163.6MB file ‘enwiki-latest-pages-
articles1.xml’ from Wikipedia. This is one of the publically available datasets available at ‘https://
dumps.wikipedia.ord/enwiki/latest’. The inbuilt Hadoop command ‘hadoop fs –moveFromLocal [source 
| destination]’ was used to push the file from the local file system to be distributed into HDFS (Apache, 
2013). The default block size (64MB) and block replication factor (three) were used. Having issued the 
inbuilt command ‘dfsadmin –report’ to confirm that the file was successfully distributed and replicated 
across HDFS and the cluster was in a healthy state, the deletion scenario was implemented. The data 
was deleted from HDFS with the command ‘hadoop fs -rm [target file]’ (Apache, 2013). The success of 
the deletion was verified via the Hadoop web UI (see Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3. Hadoop web UI output post deletion (simulated attack) showing the empty directory from the NameNode. 
6.2 Forensic Process - Application of Methodology  
Having created forensic artefacts for investigation in the cluster, the forensic process could commence. 
The designed methodology (see Section 5.2) was used as a guideline for the procedure undertaken, 
and this section shall discuss the methods used in each phase. The focus was placed on NameNode 
RAM acquisition and analysis in order to ascertain whether targeted acquisition of DataNodes would 
be possible based on the results found; a full forensic investigation of the DataNode images was 
beyond the scope of this investigation. 
Phase 1 – Preparation 
This phase is not required in this proof of concept; as creators of the scenario we already had the 
required knowledge and access.  
Phase 2 – Live Acquisition of NameNode  
The Linux memory acquisition tool fmem was used image the NameNode’s RAM.  This tool was chosen 
as it circumvents the kernel protection which otherwise prevents access to the /dev/mem directory 
that contains the system RAM. This restriction applies even to users with root permissions (Ubuntu, 
2015). Once fmem has been installed and compiled, it can be invoked in with the syntax ‘sudo dd 
if=/dev/fmem of=[output directory] bs=512’. In our instance this created a 3.2GB image of the 
NameNode's RAM.  
Phase 3 – Initial Cluster Reconnaissance  
Initial cluster reconnaissance was performed using the three inbuilt Hadoop command scripts 
introduced in Section 5.2. As explained there, this is carried out after the RAM acquisition in order to 
avoid contamination of the RAM. The Hadoop filesystem checking utility ‘hadoop fsck -blocks’ (Apache, 
2013) was invoked first to obtain high-level information about the cluster; the ‘-blocks’ option provides 
a block report. The output is shown in Figure 4a. The utility has three further optional parameters 
which can be used to tailor the output: ‘-rack’ to provide a network topology of the cluster, ‘-files’ to 
list the files within the cluster and ‘-locations’. The latter shows which DataNodes each data block is 
stored on. However, this only provides a high level block-to-node mapping which does not include the 
physical start offset locations of the data HDFS blocks; it also proved of no value to our investigation as 
it includes only current, not deleted blocks. Secondly, additional information of forensic value was 
obtained with the 'dfsadmin -report' command script (Apache, 2013) which returns a detailed 
snapshot of the state of the HDFS cluster that includes DataNode IP addresses, configured node/ 
cluster capacity and percentage of disk space used/available. Example output is shown in Figure 4b.  
Thirdly, the OIV (offline image viewer) is an inbuilt HDFS administrative utility which enables a human 
readable view of the HDFS tree from the raw hex FsImage file (Apache, 2013). Figure 5 shows the 
output from the OIV command issued with the syntax 'oiv -i [input file] -o [output directory]'. 
Comparing the OIV output with the DFS in use (40KB per DataNode) shown in Figure 4a, we can 
conclude that the highlighted file (approx 163MB) must have been deleted from HDFS. 
Figure 4(a). Output of the command 'hadoop fsck –blocks' showing default replication factor, number of corrupt blocks, 
number of racks in the cluster and other information of potential forensic value.  
(b). Output from the ‘dfsadmin –report’ command issued post deletion of HDFS data. The first paragraph shows the system 
summary including total configured cluster size; values given are the sum of the corresponding DataNode values. The line 
'Decommission Status: Normal' denotes that a node is live. Other forensically valuable information includes the DataNode IP 
addresses, HDFS storage capacity and percentage of HDFS used.  
student@hadoopMaster:~$ hadoop dfsadmin –report 
Configured Capacity: 286855438336 (267.15 GB) 
Present Capacity: 262510673920 (244.48 GB) 
DFS Remaining: 262510551040 (244.48 GB) 
DFS Used: 122880 (120 KB) 
DFS Used%: 0% 
Under replicated blocks: 0 
Blocks with corrupt replicas: 0 
Missing blocks: 0 
 
--------------------- 
Datanodes available: 3 (3 total, 0 dead) 
 
Name: 192.168.1.100:50010 
Decommission Status: Normal 
Configured Capacity: 75515535360 (70.33 GB) 
DFS Used: 40960 (40 KB) 
Non DFS Used: 7199408128 (6.7 GB) 
DFS Remaining: 68316086272 (63.62 GB) 
DFS Used%: 0% 
DFS Remaining%: 90.47% 
Last contact: Tue Mar 03 16:48:25 GMT 2015 
 
Name: 192.168.1.101:50010 
Decommission Status: Normal 
Configured Capacity: 60247990272 (56.11 GB) 
DFS Used: 40960 (40 KB) 
Non DFS Used: 6239903744 (5.81 GB) 
DFS Remaining: 54008045568 (50.3 GB) 
DFS Used%: 0% 
DFS Remaining%: 89.64% 
Last contact: Tue Mar 03 16:48:25 GMT 2015 
 
Name: 192.168.1.102:50010 
Decommission Status: Normal 
Configured Capacity: 151091912704 (140.72 GB) 
DFS Used: 40960 (40 KB) 
Non DFS Used: 10905452544 (10.16 GB) 
DFS Remaining: 140186419200 (130.56 GB) 
DFS Used%: 0% 
DFS Remaining%: 92.78% 
Last contact: Tue Mar 03 16:48:25 GMT 2015 
student@hadoopMaster:~$ hadoop fsck -blocks 
FSCK started by student from /192.168.1.103 for  
path / at Tue Mar 03 16:47:22 GMT 2015 
.Status: HEALTHY 
 Total size:  4 B 
 Total dirs:  8 
 Total files: 1 
 Total blocks (validated):    1 (avg. block size 4 B) 
 Minimally replicated blocks: 1 (100.0%) 
 Over-replicated blocks:      0 (0.0%) 
 Under-replicated blocks:     0 (0.0%) 
 Mis-replicated blocks:       0 (0.0%) 
 Default replication factor:  3 
 Average block replication:   3.0 
 Corrupt blocks:              0 
 Missing replicas:            0 (0.0%) 
 Number of data-nodes:        3 
 Number of racks:             1 
FSCK ended at Tue Mar 03 16:47:22 GMT 2015 in 11 
milliseconds 
 
The filesystem under path '/' is HEALTHY 
(b) 
(a) 
 
Figure 5. Output from running the OIV command against the FsImage file stored on the NameNode. Highlighted is the 
Wikipedia XML file that was stored in HDFS. Reading from left to right: file permissions, replication factor (3), owner, group, 
total file size, file access date and time, and finally the file path in HDFS.  
Phase 4 - Checkpointing via a Forensic Workstation  
Due to the fact that the cluster was in use only for this experiment, and it was categorically known that 
no further transactions had taken place, this phase could be omitted. However, as discussed in 
Sections 3.4 and 5.2 (Phase 4), it is strongly recommended that this phase be conducted in non-
experimental environments.   
Phase 5 – Live artefact analysis  
The aim of this phase is to establish the HDFS namespace containing the block-to-offset mapping to 
facilitate targeted DataNode acquisition. Initially the captured RAM image was manually viewed in the 
Linux hex editor Bless to search for evidence strings from the deleted Wikipedia file. As a result of this 
manual analysis of the RAM capture, evidence of data block IDs was found. Figure 6 shows two 
examples. 
  
Figure 6. Two extracts from the RAM image of the NameNode showing examples of data block information stored. Differences 
are highlighted in bold and underlined. Both examples show information about the same block, replicated on nodes M1 and 
M3 respectively (note the identical block ID). The URI identifying each DataNode and its default port is followed by the 
universal string ‘browseBlock.jsp?blockId=’. The headers shown contain the same information, except for ordering, and one 
crucial difference: the startOffset address is included for the block replica on M3, but missing for the replica on M1. 
Figure 6 also illustrates that the string ‘browseBlock.jsp?blockId=’ was found to directly precede each 
data block ID stored in RAM. Viewing the Hadoop source code revealed that browseBlock.jsp is a 
process that informs the NameNode’s block mapping namespace. This confirms that the string 
‘browseBlock.jsp?blockId=’ or its hex equivalent will reliably precede every block ID and can therefore 
be used as a magic number to search for references to HDFS blocks during NameNode RAM analysis. A 
Python script was developed to automate the search for instances of this string from the image and 
extract the corresponding block information. This process helped to reduce a great deal of noise from 
the original RAM image, and could aid the speed of future searches. The results file could be processed 
further to filter the output by DataNode.  
M1 block without startOffset: 
http://m1:50075/browseBlock.jsp?blockId=2724904701271491951&
blockSize=67108864&filename=%2Fdata%2Fenwiki-latest-pages-ar
ticles1.xml-p000000010p000010000&datanodePort=50010&genstamp
=1004&namenodeInfoPort=50070&chunkSizeToView=32768 
M3 block with startOffset: 
http://m3:50075/browseBlock.jsp?blockId=2724904701271491951&
blockSize=67108864&startOffset=98304&genstamp=1004&filename=
%2Fdata%2Fenwiki-latest-pages-articles1.xml-000000010p000010
000&chunkSizeToView=32768&datanodePort=50010&namenodeInfoPor
t=50070 
Phase 6 – Establish ‘suspect’ transactions and map to data block 
The Python script described in Phase 5 above was modified in to search for the strings “deletion” and 
“deleted”, and run against the DataNode subsets of the original RAM image gathered in the previous 
phase. The string ‘deletion’ was found; this made it possible to establish scheduled data block 
deletions. The results are presented and discussed in Section 7.2 and Figure 8.  
As the focus of our case study was on the RAM analysis, the suggested complementary analysis of the 
original Edits log (see Section 5.2) was omitted. However, it is expected that this would provide 
valuable corroboration and additional evidence particularly in an investigation against a large cluster.  
Phase 7 – Perform Targeted Dead Acquisition of DataNodes  
As described earlier, knowledge of start offset information for data blocks can facilitate targeted 
acquisition on the DataNodes. In our test, start offset information was only found for blocks stored on 
M3 (see Figure 6), and therefore this was the machine chosen to be imaged. The standard Linux 
memory imaging tool dd was used to create a physical bit-to-bit copy of M3’s disk space.  
Phase 8 – Data reconstruction  
This phase was outside of the scope of this project, which chose to focus on the NameNode RAM 
element of the methodology.  
Phase 9 – Report findings 
The results are listed and discussed in the following section.   
7. Results  
7.1 NameNode RAM Analysis  
As discussed in Section 6.2 (Phase 5) and shown in Figure 6, magic numbers were found for evidence of 
block records in the NameNode’s RAM. The remaining headers in each block record were deduced and 
are summarised in Figure 7.   
 
URI BlockID Block 
Size 
StartOffset GenStamp Filename Chunksize to 
view 
DataNode 
Port 
NameNode 
Info port 
Figure 7. Headers from the browseBlock.jsp process trace found in RAM. Two example process traces are shown in Figure 6. 
Having established that browseBlock.jsp contained a record to the block ID and start offset values for 
HDFS blocks, the Python script described in Section 6.2 was used to carve the RAM image for instances 
of this string and map it to the known blocks affected by the deletion. Table 1 illustrates the Block IDs 
(Blocks A, B, C) and startOffset values that were detected in the NameNode’s RAM image in relation to 
each DataNode (M1, M2, M3) in the cluster.  
 
Node M1 M2 M3 
 
Block 
BlockId 
found? 
StartOffset 
found? 
BlockId 
found? 
StartOffset 
found? 
BlockId 
found? 
StartOffset 
found? 
A Yes No No No Yes Yes 
B No No Yes No Yes Yes 
C No No No No No No 
Table 1. NameNode RAM analysis summary depicting which blocks were found associated with which DataNodes. 
7.2 Evidence of Deletions  
Given that Phase 6 of the proposed methodology was to ‘Establish suspect transactions and map to 
data blocks’, evidence of block deletion was searched for using the Python script discussed in Section 
6.2. The RAM extract shown in Figure 8 demonstrates that records of scheduled deletion have a 
common format which includes the time and date of the scheduled deletion, the string ‘INFO 
org.apache.hadoop.hdfs.server.datanode.DataNode: Scheduling blk_’ followed by the blockID and a 
little later by the string 'for deletion'. As these two strings occur in every trace, they, or their hex 
equivalents, can be used as magic numbers to automate the search for evidence of deletions. It is 
interesting to note that all three blocks affected by deletion were found within this section of the RAM 
extract, despite no evidence of Block C (Block ID 539013...) being found in any of the extracted 
browseBlock.jsp evidence. 
Figure 8. Extract from the NameNode’s RAM image highlighting evidence of all three HDFS data blocks being scheduled for 
deletion. The strings ‘INFO org.apache.hadoop.hdfs.server.datanode.DataNode: Scheduling blk_’  and ‘for deletion’ are 
universal, occurring in every trace. 
7.3 Complete and Incomplete browseBlock.jsp Headers  
As discussed in Sections 6.2 and 7.2, ‘browseBlock.jsp’ was identified as a signature string which could 
be used as a magic number to aid forensic searching of block references in the NameNode’s RAM. 
Using this method, evidence of 44% of block IDs was found in the RAM image (see Table 1). However 
only half of these records were complete and included the startOffset header and value. The other half 
lacked this and thus were incomplete. Figure 6 exemplifies this, it shows an incomplete example at the 
top and a complete example below. Complete and incomplete records differed only in the presence or 
absence of the startOffset; all other headers (listed in Figure 7) were present in all records. 
Given that the block replication factor was set to three and there were three blocks affected by the 
deletion, there were nine block IDs and nine separate startOffset values to carve for in the 
NameNode's RAM. Of these 44% (4/9) of block IDs were found referenced in the NameNode's RAM, 
and only 22% (2/9) of the startOffset values were found. Out of a combined total of 18 possible block 
IDs and startOffsets, only six were found referenced in the NameNode’s RAM image. To put this 
another way, two thirds were undetected, meaning that whilst some evidence of forensic importance 
was extracted by this analysis, the majority of HDFS metadata anticipated to be found were not 
uncovered.  
doop.hdfs.server.datanode.Data
Node: Scheduling blk_272490470
1271491951_1004 file /usr/loca
l/hadoop/tmp/dfs/dat..current/
blk_2724904701271491951 for de
letion. on Line: 3465725 ..Rea
d Line: 2015-03-03 16:48:53,42
9 INFO org.apache.hadoop.hdfs.
server.datanode.DataNode: Sche
duling blk_7567747605822618193
_1004 file /usr/local/hadoop/t
mp/dfs/data/current/blk_756774
7605822618193 for deletion. On 
 Line: 3465727 ..Read Line: 20
15-03-03 16:48:53,429 INFO org
.apache.hadoop.hdfs.server.dat
anode.DataNode: Scheduling blk
_5390134442919737633_1004 file 
 /usr/local/hadoop/tmp/dfs/dat
..current/blk_5390134442919737
633 for deletion. on Line: 346 
8. Discussion and Evaluation 
8.1 Discussion of Findings 
The fact that only 44% of block IDs were found in the RAM image can potentially be explained by the 
DataNodes’ heartbeat process.  Once a block has been deleted from HDFS, information about it can no 
longer be sent in the heartbeats. Given the volatile nature of RAM storage, when the NameNode 
receives a heartbeat signal from a DataNode the information pertaining to HDFS data blocks will 
dynamically overwrite what it already contains in its RAM store, meaning that the namespace 
contained is constantly evolving. If we apply this logic to the results found, or more specifically the data 
blocks not found in the RAM image, we can begin to form a theory based on individual component 
difference within the nodes, which can offer an explanation to the sparseness of results. Further 
research is required to test this theory by analysing not just the contents of a NameNode's RAM, but 
also investigating the provenance of this information by examining the DataNode's internal Java 
processes that led to the propagation of information sent in the heartbeat packets. This would aid in 
better understanding how it is that the NameNode's RAM namespace is generated and maintained.  
The results also unearthed the string ‘INFO org.apache.hadoop.hdfs.server.datanode.DataNode: 
Scheduling blk_' which was present in the NameNode’s RAM in relation to every block that was 
affected by a deletion transaction. This string, or its hex equivalent, could provide a very useful magic 
number, as it is clearly specific to a Hadoop deletion and therefore could avail useful forensic 
information. However, it should be noted that in real world scenarios using this string alone may also 
avail false positives as all deletions, whether genuine or illicit, will be output. If the block ID of the block 
illicitly deleted is known, then this could be used in combination with this string to filter for only 
relevant results. 
Although the results of 44% of BlockIDs and 22% of startOffset values found present in the 
NameNode’s RAM image appear too inconclusive to validate the success of the methodology fully, 
pragmatically speaking, in a 'real world' scenario these results would provide a means for further 
targeted acquisition on the DataNodes. The examiner would be able to target specifically the nodes in 
the cluster which had been identified as containing HDFS blocks scheduled for deletion. As the cluster 
size is scaled up, the investigative time reduction for both acquisition and analysis is exponential when 
the investigator is able to target DataNode acquisition. The amount of reduction compared to a full 
acquisition will depend on the specifics of each case. If all DataNodes in the cluster are in use and their 
disk filled with data potentially affected by the attack, the reduction in Phases 6 – 8 would be approx. 
2/3 where the HDFS cluster uses the default replication factor of three (as our method ideally acquires 
a single replica of each of the potentially compromised blocks). 
The size of the cluster per se should not directly affect the time and space requirements of the 
methodology. However, larger clusters are likely to be supported by a NameNode with larger RAM and 
to incur more transactions, increasing the size of the log files, which in turn will scale up the 
NameNode acquisition and analysis requirements. The DataNode acquisition and analysis 
requirements scale directly with the amount of data suspected to be affected by the attack if sufficient 
block offsets can be found to support partial selective acquisition from the relevant NameNodes. 
Otherwise, if entire NameNodes need to be used, the requirements scale with their typical disk size 
and the number of NameNodes the affected data is distributed across.  
The fact that startOffset values were not able to be consistently retrieved supports the 
recommendations of Spyridopoulos and Katos (2011) that technology providers should implement a 
persistent offset-to-block mapping in the NameNode’s storage. Given that the NameNode already 
stores persistent file system metadata in its FsImage file, the inclusion of this information populated 
from the NameNode’s RAM could feasibly be handled with minimum performance impact. Such an 
addition would undoubtedly increase the forensic readiness of the Hadoop architecture and speed up 
forensic procedure following an attack. 
8.2 Evaluation 
This section evaluates our method against the criteria of the NIST Computer Forensic Tool Testing 
(CFTT) Project, which specifies completeness and accuracy criteria for computer forensic tools (NIST, 
2004). Any future tool designed to automate our methodology must be validated against the CFTT 
criteria.  To afford this, our methodology should also comply in order to provide a suitable foundation.  
The remainder of this section thus evaluates our method against the first six of the eight mandatory 
CFTT criteria. The remaining two are applicable only to automated tools as they refer to dealing with 
errors. 
DI-RM-01: ‘The tool shall be able to acquire a digital source using each access interface visible to the 
tool.’ 
In our methodology three areas for acquisition were identified: (a) the NameNode’s RAM, (b) the 
NameNode’s persistent volatile artefacts (Edits log and FsImage file) and (c) images of targeted 
DataNodes, ideally selective of the specific blocks pinpointed. Due to the highly differential nature of 
these areas of acquisition, it is improbable that a single forensic tool would seek to achieve all three 
phases via the same visual interface. A wealth of disk imaging tools exist which comfortably satisfy the 
requirements of imaging a DataNode. For example, the dd tool used in our case study and the related 
dcfldd could be used for targeted partial acquisition if the required offsets have been found, or for 
acquisition of an entire DataNode where this is not the case. Given that DataNodes are designed to 
function on commodity hardware, it is unlikely that the need for a specialist acquisition tool to this end 
should arise. Conversely, an access interface tool specially intended for NameNode acquisition is an 
area of future research that warrants attention. No such tool is listed in the most recent NIST CFTT 
handbook (NIST, 2015), nor indeed are any tools specifically designed for acquisition within HDFS.  
DI-RM-02: ‘The tool shall be able to create either a clone of a digital source, or an image of a digital 
source, or provide the capability for the user to select and then create either a clone or an image of a 
digital source.’  
With knowledge of the local operating system implemented by the NameNode, a tool based on our 
methodology could meet this requirement by imaging the digital sources identified, namely the RAM 
and log files, and provide a suitable visual interface.  
DI-RM-03: ‘The tool shall operate in at least one execution environment and shall be able to acquire 
digital sources in each execution environment.’  
Any tool created specifically for Hadoop forensics must be compatible with HDFS as a basic and 
fundamental requirement. As HDFS is built for Unix based operating systems, the tool should be 
compatible with a number of Unix based operating systems, and agnostic to the native file systems and 
its endian structure. As our methodology uses HDFS and Unix based commands, it provides a suitable 
foundation. A further consideration is that companies such as Cloudera, Hortonworks and MapR offer 
managed proprietary Hadoop distributions complete with their own inbuilt administrative command 
line interfaces. A forensic tool should be compatible with the target HDFS system regardless of 
whether it is implemented through a proprietary provider or not. Finally, Hadoop’s backend 
functionality has changed substantially between 1.x.x and 2.x.x versions, particularly in regards to 
checkpointing and job scheduling. This complicates the development of a tool, as it should be 
applicable to all existing Hadoop series and multiple versions.  
DI-RM-04: ‘The tool shall completely acquire all visible data sectors from the digital source.’  
As discussed in relation to DI-RM-02, the data sectors targeted for acquisition on the NameNode are 
volatile. Whilst our methodology was able to capture these completely, the analysis presented in 
Section 7.1 found that the crucial ‘startOffset’ elements were not always present in the RAM capture 
relating to a browseBlock.jsp process, even when corresponding HDFS block IDs had been identified in 
the same process in RAM. Our case study has demonstrated that full compliance with this condition 
would rely on permanent storage of physical block locations on the NameNode. We concur with 
Spyridopoulos and Katos (2011) in recommending that such permanent storage should be 
implemented by developers of distributed file systems in order to improve forensic readiness. In the 
absence of this, a tool would have to acquire the identified subset of DataNodes in their entirety, 
which would present the issues of privacy due to multi-tenancy and data volume discussed earlier. 
DI-RM-05: ‘The tool shall completely acquire all hidden data sectors from the digital source.’ 
‘Hidden data sectors’ refers to host protected areas within the target system which cannot be accessed 
through standard file system read/write operations. This is relevant to a tool based on our 
methodology as the acquisition of the /dev/mem RAM repository requires kernel level access which is 
not normally available (see Section 6.2, Phase 2). Fmem was shown to be suitable for RAM capture in 
our case study as it installs a kernel module on the target system which circumvents Linux’s native 
protection. This could be used by an automated acquisition tool.   
DI-RM-06: ‘All data sectors acquired by the tool from the digital source shall be accurately acquired.’ 
Our methodology sets as one of its core requirements the need to minimise direct cluster interaction. 
An automated acquisition tool based on the method should therefore be an accurate representation of 
the RAM image at the time of acquisition, though its accurate representation of the RAM at the time of 
the attack would depend on the operations logged during the elapsed time. Further to this, acquiring a 
copy of the FsImage and Edits log and performing a checkpoint operation via a forensic workstation 
will ensure that the examiner has access to both the up to date HDFS namespace (once all transaction 
have been mapped), and all the transactions in the Edits log that occurred between the previous 
checkpoint and the attack.  
9. Conclusion 
This paper has provided a suggested methodology for Hadoop forensics, tested the NameNode RAM 
acquisition and analysis phases of the methodology against a live Hadoop cluster in a case study and 
discussed the methodology's compliance with the NIST CFTT framework. Future work should be 
undertaken to test the methodology against larger cluster implementations, and further to extend the 
experience to include forensic analysis of the targeted DataNodes. While our scenario of deleted data 
presents the 'worst case' (see Sections 4 and 6.1), the methodology should also be tested against 
scenarios of data corruption or modification, and situations where it is unknown how the data was 
compromised.  
Further to this, the methodology in its current state is applicable to in-house Hadoop scenarios. The 
greater complexity of outsourced environments means that in such instances Hadoop forensics will 
remain a problematic area. This is exemplified by the fact that the Linux operating system requires the 
installation of a kernel module in order to perform RAM acquisition (Section 6.2 Phase 2).  
When factoring in issues beyond technicality (i.e. multi-tenancy, and physical cluster access) it is clear 
that we are a long way from complete forensic readiness in outsourced Hadoop implementations. 
Further work needs to be conducted academically and collaboratively with technology providers to 
address these issues, and provide a workable solution to outsourced Hadoop implementations.  
The aim of this project was to simulate a data breach attack within a Hadoop cluster, and design and 
implement a suitable methodology for forensic investigation thereof. Our methodology is drawn from 
existing research in the area, and utilises an initial live acquisition stage on the NameNode. This 
predicates further targeted acquisition on the DataNodes. The rationale behind this methodology 
being that with awareness of what data blocks were affected by an attack a move away from the dated 
blanket acquisition approach of traditional forensics could be sought, which given the scale of Hadoop 
implementations is necessary for future forensic approaches. By identifying two strings that can be 
used as magic number during the RAM analysis on the NameNode, the investigation was able to 
establish a proportion of blockIDs and startOffset values relating to deleted HDFS data blocks, although 
complete transparency was not available. This supports the suggestion of the designed methodology 
to include NameNode RAM forensics as a prerequisite to Hadoop forensics, as the identification of the 
deleted blockIDs in the namespace would enable the hosting DataNodes to be targeted for imaging. 
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